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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-WHEN COERCED STATEMENTS LEAD
TO MORE EVIDENCE: THE "POISONOUS TREE" BLOOMS AGAIN
IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In signing the Declaration of Independence, this country adopted the
common law of England across most of the land.1 With that common law
came several implicit privileges, including Nemo tenetur seipsum prodere (that
no one was bound to accuse himself).2 Because the scope of the privilege
was never defined, even in the United States Constitution, there were legit-
imate concerns regarding its scope in the New World.3
To protect this privilege from being undermined by police coercion,
the United States Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona.4 Miranda
provided several prophylactic rights separate from, but designed to pro-
tect, the rights provided by the Fifth Amendment.5
Dispute about the scope and ramifications of these rights in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has focused recently
on derivative evidence procured as a result of prior violations of the right
against self-incrimination. 6 As a result, the Third Circuit took a bold, risky
step in importing concepts from its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
1. See Constantine Athanas, Comment, Equivocal Requests for an Attorney: Ca-
veat Emptor Comes to the Fifth Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 673, 679 (1996) (discussing
adoption of English common law by majority of states of new union).
2. See id. (noting importation of privilege). Interestingly, it was our Puritan
heritage that is most responsible for the creation of the privilege. See id. at 678.
(noting Puritan heritage was factored into creation). English Catholics had diffi-
culty challenging the oath ex officio because it was part of Canon law. See id. Like-
wise, the Protestants found the oath useful in persecuting Puritans. See id.
3. See id. at 679 (noting unclear scope of historical right). Ms. Athanas also
points out that the literature of the period is probably our best guess as to the
historical scope, and that, in sum, the conclusion is that no suspect was to be used
to prove his or her own guilt. See id. at 680. The requirement excluding coerced
testimony did, however, only apply to testimony coerced by the state and not testi-
mony that was the product of social or idiosyncratic forces. See, e.g., Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-05 (1985) (noting Fifth Amendment is only concerned
with state coercion); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, & n.3 (1983) (per
curiam) (same); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303, & n.10 (1980) (same);
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (same).
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (noting difference between Fifth Amendment
violation and Miranda violation); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)
(noting intent in Miranda was to protect existing rights, not to expand scope of
those rights).
6. See United States v. Tyler, 169 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting issue
revolves around derivative evidence procured at least in part due to earlier viola-
tions of Miranda), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1480 (1999).
(843)
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into its analyses of Fifth Amendment concerns.' The explicit addition of
Fourth Amendment "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis to Miranda juris-
prudence was rejected earlier by the Supreme Court.' Nonetheless, the
Third Circuit indicated that examination of the totality of the circum-
stances surrounding the supposed waiver requires the inclusion of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis.9
The issue of derivative evidence following a violation of Miranda was
an issue of first impression for the Third Circuit.10 In order to provide a
framework in which to understand the current decision, this Casebrief
focuses on the history and ideology of both Miranda and the Fifth Amend-
ment. Part II discusses the history of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, as well as Miranda and related cases." Part III discusses the Third
Circuit's analysis of custodial interrogation cases and enumerates the fun-
damental interests considered by the court.12 Part LV analyzes the impact
of this approach for both persons suspected of crimes and their counsel,
as well as for the prosecutors who wish to strengthen their cases.' 3
II. HISTORY
Our privilege against self-incrimination is an artifact of our English
heritage. 14 It should thus come as no surprise that English common law
7. See id. (noting that Fourth Amendment analysis should guide inquiry into
Fifth Amendment question). The risk here stems from the Supreme Court's ex-
plicit disapproval of this mixture in violations of the Miranda decision's directives.
See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09 (rejecting use of Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence in
Miranda cases).
8. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308 (noting no "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis
for Miranda violations).
9. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 158 (stating totality of evidence includes poisonous
tree analysis). Because the Miranda prophylactic rules and the Fifth Amendment
are conceptually distinct, the application of the poisonous tree analysis is possible.
See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307-08 (noting distinction between Fifth Amendment and
Miranda rules).
10. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 155 (describing case as one of first impression).
11. For a discussion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination,
the Miranda decision and the resulting structure of Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence, see infra notes 14-97 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis of Fifth Amendment inter-
ests, including the incorporation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, see
infra notes 98-152 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the repercussions of the Third Circuit's mode of analy-
sis for criminal attorneys, see infra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
14. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-97 (1896) (establishing English
origins of right against self-incrimination). In Brown the Court noted:
The maxim 'Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare,' had its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating
accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system, and,
until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the
erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against
the exercise of arbitrary power, was not uncommon even in England.
While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and
[Vol. 44: p. 843
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played an important part in the initial formulation of the right.15 An ac-
cepted corollary of this right was that a confession that was not freely given
was not admissible at trial. 16 Although the standards involved bear no
semblance to each other, early jurisprudence on the privilege prohibited
many of the same behaviors as modern jurisprudence. 17 After its initial
freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evi-
dence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection
with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the
witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him
into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so
painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir
Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the sys-
tem so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The
change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be
founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general
and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however
adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in Ameri-
can jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system im-
press themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the
States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused
person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in Eng-
land was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the
impregnability of a constitutional enactment.
Id.; see Athanas, supra note 1, at 679 (discussing origin of Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination).
The right originated as a response to ecclesiastical courts' practice of requir-
ing the oath ex officio forcing defendants to testify in cases where the charges and
evidence were secret, then questioning them until they perjured themselves, in-
criminated themselves or refused to answer. See Athenas, supra note 1, at 677-78
(noting origin of right). In response, Parliament banned the use of the oath as
repugnant to the "law of Nature." Id. at 678.
In the Declaration of Independence, the states adopted the common law of
England, and with it, the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 679 (noting
states adoption of privilege).
15. See generally Athanas, supra note 1. The first impression of the Supreme
Court on the question of voluntariness was found in Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574
(1884). In Hopt, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of defining a standard that
could limit the exclusion of confessions while protecting the right against self-in-
crimination, but stated that if a suspect is deprived "of that freedom of will or self-
control essential to make his confession voluntary within the meaning of the law,"
then the inculpatory statement cannot be admitted into evidence. Id. at 584-85.
16. See Athanas, supra note 1, at 681-82 (noting inadmissability). It was also
recognized that there were multiple paths leading to involuntary confessions be-
sides torture. See id. at 682. Indeed, police coercion was also contemplated; it
could negate the will required to make a confession voluntary. See id.
17. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 549 (1897) (defining concept of
voluntariness and finding coercive, non-violent police tactics rendered confession
involuntary). In Bram, the interrogating police officer informed a murder suspect,
"[Y]our position is rather an awkward one. I have had [another suspect] in this
office and he made a statement that he saw you do the murder." Id. at 539. In the
resulting discussion, the suspect incriminated himself. See id. The Court reasoned
that "when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had
charged him with the crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that
if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt." Id. at 562.
1999]
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jurisprudence, however, the United States Supreme Court turned its back
on the old ways and began using a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
analysis in self-incrimination cases.18 At first, this shift in paradigms lim-
ited the scope of the privilege to cases involving physical torture.19 The
Court soon broadened its interpretation, including "torture of the mind"
as well as that of the body.20 This case-by-case due process analysis, how-
ever, provided no guidance to lower courts.
2 1
Modern jurisprudence began after the incorporation of the Fifth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 2 The incorporation
paved the way for Miranda and its resultant judicially legislated protections
Therefore, reasoned the Court, the statement was the product of "hope or fear"
and inadmissible. Id.
Other forms of police coercion are equally taboo. See Ziang Sung Wan v.
United States, 266 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1924) (characterizing lengthy questioning of ill
suspect as coercive). In Ziang Sung Wan, police interrogated a sick suspect in a
hotel room where, as a result of "persistent, lengthy, and repeated cross-examina-
tion," he confessed to three murders. Id. at 11-13. The Court held that "the requi-
site of voluntariness is not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was
not induced by a promise or a threat." Id. at 14. Due to the length and intensity of
the interrogation of the defendant while he was ill, the Court could not find that
the confession was made voluntarily. See id. at 15.
18. See Athanas, supra note 1, at 683 (stating that Court shifted perspective to
Due Process analysis). The Court had previously held that the self-incrimination
clause could not be applied to the states as part of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process clause. See id.
19. See id. at 684 (discussing initial limitations of Due Process analysis of self-
incrimination privilege violations).
20. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949) ("When a suspect speaks be-
cause he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been subjected to a physical
or a mental ordeal."); see also Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 566 (1958) ("That
petitioner was not physically tortured affords no answer to the question whether
the confession was coerced .... "). Note, however, that these were still brutal cases.
In Payne, for example, a "mentally dull" young African-American was interrogated
in relation to a crime the day before. See Payne, 356 U.S. at 562 n.4, 563. He was
arrested without warrant, was not brought before a magistrate to be informed of
his rights as required by Indiana law, was held incommunicado for three days, was
underfed and under-clothed and was finally told that the police would be hard-
pressed to restrain the mob waiting outside that wanted to "get him" when he
confessed. See id. at 562-65. While failing to feed and clothe a suspect could be
deemed physical torture, the Court held that purely mental tactics could also be
torturous. See id. at 566. It is worth noting, however, that there was some prece-
dent that the presence of a prior confession was of such coercive nature that any
subsequent confession must be a fruit of the first. See United States v. Bayer, 331
U.S. 532, 540 (1947) ("After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by
confessing... [t] he secret is out for good. In such a case, a later confession may
always be looked upon as fruit of the first.").
21. See Athanas, supra note 1, at 683-86 (noting lack of guidance provided by
Supreme Court). Although it is true that some inferences can be drawn from fact-
based inquiries, the argument here is that a bright line rule, or even a line that is
"fuzzy" does much more to illuminate lower courts. Cf id. at 686 (showing due
process analysis lacked bright line rule, requiring case-by-case analysis).
22. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (stating that American criminal
system is not inquisitorial and application of Fifth Amendment to states is there-
fore mandated).
846 [Vol. 44: p. 843
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of Fifth Amendment principles. 23 Recall that in Miranda, police arrested
and interrogated suspect Ernesto Miranda without making him aware that
he had a right to have an attorney present at the interrogation. 24 That
Miranda had signed a form with a typewritten clause claiming he had full
knowledge of his legal rights was not enough to establish a knowing and
intelligent waiver of those constitutional rights.
25
The Court held that the prosecution cannot use any statements made
by the defendant in its case-in-chief unless it can meet several procedural
safeguards, including the famous "Miranda warnings." 26 The Court re-
minded us that a "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" made waiver is
required before police may obtain statements to be used as evidence. 27
The Court later acknowledged that these procedural safeguards were not
intended to cripple interrogation as a method of procuring evidence, but
23. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (noting difference be-
tween violation of Miranda and violation of Fifth Amendment); Michigan v.
Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating Miranda protections are procedural safe-
guards, not constitutional rights by themselves).
24. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966) (describing arrest). Note
that the right to presence of counsel at custodial interrogations was enshrined by
Escobedo v. Illinois. See 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding refusal of request for counsel
during interrogatioin violates Sixth Amendment).
25. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492 (noting that signing of form is insufficient
evidence of knowing and intelligent waiver). Cf Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 512-13 (1966) (noting that voluntariness clause contained in document al-
leged to be involuntary has no evidentiary value); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601
(1948) (Douglas, J., concurring) (holding boy 15 years old cannot be assumed to
have knowledge necessary for knowing and intelligent waiver). Note also that, as
our Sixth Amendment jurisprudence shows, the government has the burden of
proving a knowing and intelligent waiver of a constitutional right. SeeJohnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("[Clourts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and.., do not presume acqui-
escence in the loss of fundamental rights.") (footnotes and internal quotes omit-
ted); see also Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (noting presumption against
waiver); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) (same).
26. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (describing limitation placed on prosecution
to protect constitutional rights). The Court limited the application of Miranda to
custodial interrogation and defined that as "questioning initiated by law enforce-
ment officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way." Id. The warnings are not strictly
required, as the Court left open the possibility of other safeguards. See id. The
warnings themselves must inform the suspect "that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he
has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id.
27. Id. The Court also made clear that if the suspect "indicates in any manner
and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking there can be no questioning." Id. at 444-45. Also, the Court admonished
that there can be no questioning of an unrepresented subject who indicates "in
any manner" that he does not wish to be interrogated. Id. at 445. Finally, the
Court noted that the suspect may terminate the questioning at any time. See id.
1999]
5
Bowman: Constitutional Law - When Coerced Statements Lead to More Evidenc
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44: p. 843
rather to buttress the privilege against self-incrimination. 28 The Court
also invited the states and Congress to devise an alternative solution.29
What exactly is interrogation within the meaning of Miranda? The
Court had occasion to answer that question in Rhode Island v. Innis.30 In
Innis, the defendant was suspected of robbing a taxicab driver and then
killing the man by firing a sawed-off shotgun into the back of his head at
point-blank range.31 The suspect, after having been read his Miranda
rights three times, invoked his right to counsel.3 2 While the suspect was
being transported to the station, officers discussed between themselves the
possibility that a child might stumble upon the weapon and kill herself 3 3
The suspect then interrupted and led police to the weapon.3 4
In its analysis, the Court started with the definition of interrogation in
Miranda: "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of ac-
tion in any significant way."35 The Court noted specifically that this defini-
28. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (stating that intent in
Miranda was to protect existing rights, not to expand scope of those rights). In
Tucker, the suspect was arrested for rape after police followed his dog from the
crime scene to Tucker's home. See id. at 435-36. Police informed Tucker that he
had the right to counsel at the interrogation and that any statement he made
could be used against him in the future. See id. at 436. Tucker was not, however,
informed that an attorney would be provided to him if he could not afford one.
See id. Tucker then made statements that led police to another witness, whose
testimony incriminated Tucker. See id. at 436-37. The interrogation occurred
before Miranda, but the trial after, so the Court held Miranda applied. See id. at
435. The Court compared the facts of the case with the practices sought to be
abolished by Miranda and determined that the practices employed at the instant
case bore no semblance to Miranda. See id. at 444-45. Miranda required only that
statements made without its protective warnings not be used in the prosecution's
case-in-chief. See id. at 445. Because the Court found no violation of Tucker's Fifth
Amendment rights, the conviction stood. See id. at 449-50.
29. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 490 (inviting legislative solution to coerced con-
fessions). Congress did take some steps to displace Miranda, See 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1994) (defining evidentiary requirements of confessions). The United States
Supreme Court has not yet considered the constitutional implications of this stat-
ute. See Edward M. Hendrie, Beyond "Miranda", FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT BULL., Mar.
1997, at 2 (noting absence of Court review of constitutionality of § 3501). There is
still some argument about the legitimacy of judge-made prophylactic rules. See
generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 190
(1988) (observing debate and defending Miranda).
30. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
31. See id. at 293 (describing method of murder). The perpetrator had then
buried the taxi driver in a shallow grave, where the body was discovered four days
later.
32. See id. at 294 (showing suspect invoked his right to counsel).
33. See id. at 294-95 (stating officers discussed amongst themselves possibility
that child might stumble upon weapon and kill herself).
34. See id. at 295 (noting suspect then interrupted and led police to weapon).
35. Id. at 298 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)) (internal
quotes omitted).
848
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tion was not limited merely to direct questioning.36 The Court found that
the "functional equivalent" of direct questioning' also constituted interro-
gation. 37 To the extent that this standard examines behavior "reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect," it is specifici-
cally focused on the perceptions of the suspect, not the intentions of the
police.38 As applied to Innis, there could be no interrogation because the
police were not questioning him and it was unforeseeable that Innis' con-
science was particularly susceptible to the plight of special-needs
children.
39
Because it is clear that information obtained in violation of Miranda
cannot be used in the prosecution's case-in-chief, the argument has been
made that evidence obtained as a result of violations of Miranda should be
36. See id. at 298-99 (noting concerns of Miranda reached practices other than
direct questioning). The Court noted that the concerns in Miranda were that the
"interrogation environment" created by the effect of interrogation combined with
custody would "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner" and decimate
the practicality of the privilege. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58. The Court specifi-
cally denoted as coercive the procedure known as the "reverse line-up," where a
suspect was placed in a line-up and a coached witness "identified" him as the per-
petrator. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299. The Court also acknowledged that interrogation
must be something more coercive than mere custody. See id. at 300.
37. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01 (concluding that Fifth Amendment definition of
interrogation included direct questioning or its functional equivalent). The Court
defined the functional equivalent of direct questioning as "any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse from the suspect." Id. (footnotes omitted).
38. Id. at 301-02 & n.7. The Court was careful to note, however, that:
This is not to say that the intent of the police is irrelevant, for it may well
have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their words
or actions were reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response. In
particular, where a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating
response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be
one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have
that effect.
Id. at n.7. This definition of interrogation was also intended to shelter the suspect
from exploitation of factors of which both the police are aware and which make
the suspect unusually susceptive to a particular ploy. See id. at n.8.
39. See id. at 302 (noting that police conversation did not qualify as interroga-
tion under Miranda). The Court also noted that Innis was not "unusually disori-
ented or upset at the time of his arrest." Id. at 303. It would then appear that the
suspect's psychological state would play into the analysis of whether the police
knew a ploy was reasonably likely to induce an incriminating response.
1999]
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similarly barred from admission. 40 In Oregon v. Elstad,41 the Court had
occasion to decide whether a failure by law enforcement to issue Miranda
warnings, without proof that any coercion actually occurred, could taint
subsequent admissions made after a recitation of the Miranda rights and a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of those rights. 42
In Elstad, the suspect was approached by police officers following
identification by a burglary witness.4 3 Elstad made an incriminating re-
40. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (banning statements made in custodial inter-
rogations without warnings from entering as evidence in prosecution's case-in-
chief). The basis for this argument is Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963). In Wong Sun, police received a tip from an informant, who had not yet
proven reliable or unreliable, that someone named "Blackie Toy" was selling her-
oin from a laundry. See id. at 473. Several illegal arrests and attendant searches
later, the trail of evidence led to the arrest of Wong. See id. at 474-76. The evi-
dence against Wong included some heroin found in another suspect's home and
an incriminating statement. See id. at 475-77. Wong argued that both were the
fruits of illegal arrests and searches and as such should be suppressed. See id. at
477. The Court held that the "exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indi-
rect as the direct products of [unconstitutional] invasions." Id. at 484 (citing
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)). The fruits of illegal
searches may consist of both the tangible products of those searches as well as
utterances and other verbal evidence procured as a result of the initial constitu-
tional violation. See id. at 485-86 (citing Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115 F.2d 690
(1940)). The Court found that Wong's incriminating statement, being made sev-
eral days after the illegal arrest and following Wong's release on his own recogni-
zance, was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of the illegal arrest so as to be
admissible against him. See id. at 491 (citing Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338,
341 (1939)). The narcotics were also admissible against Wong because they were
obtained without violating any of Wong's constitutional rights. See id. at 491-92.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine has traditionally applied solely to
violations of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305-
06 (1984) (finding difference between violation of Constitution's Fourth Amend-
ment and decision in Miranda); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)
("The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are 'not themselves rights pro-
tected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right
against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected'" (quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (editorial alteration and footnote omitted in original)).
As noted by the Court in Elstad, "The purpose of the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule is to deter unreasonable searches, no matter how probative their
fruits." 470 U.S. at 306 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216-17 (1979);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600-02 (1975)). In contrast, the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the use of compelled testimony. See EIstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07. While
there are quite different interests involved, and the Court has been loathe to ex-
tend the protective umbra of the exclusionary rule to cover violations of the Mi-
randa decision, the Court has never had occasion to consider violation of the Fifth
Amendment proper and whether such a violation could result in taint carrying to
further evidence.
41. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
42. See id. at 300 (stating issue is whether police failure to issue Miranda warn-
ings without proof of coercion precludes admission of self-incriminating evidence
following issuance and waiver of warnings). Note that this decision involves viola-
tion of Miranda, and not of the Fifth Amendment proper.
43. See Elstad, 410 U.S. at 300 (explaining circumstances of approach). Elstad
was seen by neighbors of the burglary victim and known as a local resident. See id.
[Vol. 44: p. 843
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mark and a pre-existing warrant for his arrest was executed. 4 4 At the sta-
tion, police read Elstad his rights and Elstad waived them to make further
incriminating signed statements. 45 At trial, Elstad moved to have both the
home statement and the later signed statements suppressed. 46 The Court
noted that:
The Oregon court assumed and respondent here contends that a
failure to administer Miranda warnings necessarily breeds the
same consequences as police infringement of a constitutional
right, so that evidence uncovered following an unwarned state-
ment must be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." We
believe this view misconstrues the nature of the protections af-
forded by Miranda warnings and therefore misreads the conse-
quences of police failure to supply them.
47
The Court recalled that the Fifth Amendment is only concerned with testi-
monial evidence. 48 The only pressure to confess recognized by the Fifth
Amendment is official coercion. 49 Thus, mere violation of the technical
requirements of Miranda is not an error of constitutional dimensions.5 0
Police questioned Elstad in his living room before arresting him, and during this
questioning Elstad admitted his presence at the burglary. See id.
44. See id. at 300-01 (describing circumstances of arrest). The warrant issued
upon identification by the witness, but police did not execute it until after Elstad
had made his incriminating remark. See id.
45. See id. at 301-02 (noting actions at station). The delay between the two
interrogations was approximately one hour. See id. at 301. Elstad then admitted he
was paid "a small bag of grass" to show a group of people the victims' house and
how to gain entry to it. Id. at 301-02.
46. See id. at 302 (noting suppression motion).
47. Id. at 304. Elstad had relied on United States v. Bayer. See 331 U.S. 532, 540
(1947) (holding subsequent confessions are always fruit of initial confession). In
Bayer, the Court remarked that:
After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psycholog-
ical and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get
the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a
later confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first.
Id. Elstad had also relied upon Wong Sun v. United States. See 371 U.S. 471, 484-85
(1963) (noting that evidence obtained as result of violation of constitutional right
must be suppressed).
48. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304 (stating that Fifth Amendment is unconcerned
with nontestimonial evidence and citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764
(1966) (holding defendant may be compelled to supply blood samples)). Cf Kate
Greenwood & Jeffrey A. Brown, Custodial Interrogations, 86 GEO, L.J. 1318, 1318
(1998) (noting that Fifth Amendment protects against compulsion and coercion).
49. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304-05 (noting Fifth Amendment concern over offi-
cial coercion).
50. See id. at 305 (noting that violation of requirements of Miranda not suffi-
cient to violate Constitution). The Court did not, however, state whether official
coercion proper would be sufficient grounds for a "fruit of the poisonous tree"
suppression of evidence discovered as a result of the inappropriate behavior. See
id. at 304-05. Also note that individual state constitutions and common law may be
interpreted to provide more freedom than the federal constitution. See generally
1999] CASEBRIEF 851
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Because the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine only applies to constitu-
tional errors, it was inapplicable to the case at bar.
51
A. The Mosley Revolution
Upon invocation of either the right to remain silent or the right to
counsel during an interrogation, all police questioning must cease.5 2 The
invocation of these rights, however, must be objectively unambiguous. 5 3
Katherine E. McMahon, "Cat-Out-of-the-Bag" & "Break-in-the-Stream-of-Events" Massa-
chusetts'Rejection of Oregon v. Elstad For Suppression of Warned Statements Made After a
Miranda Violation, 20 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 173 (1998). Thus, Massachusetts has
held that a voluntary statement obtained after technical violation of Miranda may
be inadmissible under Massachusetts common law. See id. at 179. At least one
commentator holds the view that this interpretation of Miranda as prophylactic
may have induced some law enforcement officers to violate its directives intention-
ally. See Kimbery A. Crawford, Intentional Violations of Miranda: A Strategy for Liabil-
ity, FBI LAw ENFORCEMENT Buus., Aug. 1997, at 5-6 (arguing that viewing of
Miranda rights as procedural may have influenced some law enforcement officers
to violate them intentionally).
51. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (holding that "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine does not apply to mere technical violations of prophylactic rule).
52. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966) (noting invocation of
rights to be "scrupulously honored"). Compare Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d
1091, 1096-97 (6th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (holding continued questioning after sus-
pect said "I can't tell you no more tonight" violated Miranda); United States v.
Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding violation when police fail
to clarify equivocal invocation); United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1988) (finding 10 minutes of questioning silent defendant violative of Mi-
randa), and Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 101-02 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding re-
peated invocations of rights under Miranda followed only by more police
questioning violated Miranda), with Medina v. Singletary, 59 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 n.5
(11 th Cir. 1995) (holding that where otherwise cooperative suspect states he does
not wish to speak, followed by "let me tell you what I'm [sic] think" and statement,
there is no violation), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1247 (1996), and United States v.
D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding re-approach of silent sus-
pect with claim of more detailed questions does not violate suspect's rights).
A good illustration is Medina, 59 F.3d at 1095. In Medina, a 21-year-old Cuban
immigrant was sentenced to die for the murder of a friend. See id. at 1099. The
interrogation proceeded in two phases: a preliminary unrecorded phase designed
to organize the information and a recorded phase designed to produce coherent
testimony. See id. at 1101. Medina was read his rights and cooperated with the
preliminary phase. See id. at 1101-02. The recorder was then turned on and Me-
dina was again informed of his rights. See id. at 1102. When asked if he wished to
speak to the officers, Medina replied "No." See id. at n.5. Due to the response style
of the suspect, the court found the officer could have interpreted the negative as
either "No, I don't want to stop" or "No, I don't want to speak." See id. at 1102 &
n.5. The officer then asked Medina to clarify that, and Medina continued with the
interview. See id. at n.5. The court held that there was not an unambiguous asser-
tion of the right, and therefore no violation. See id. at 1104.
53. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994) (noting assertion of
right must be unambiguous, or else police are under no obligation to stop interro-
gation). The analysis must also be an objective analysis. See id. "A suspect must
articulate his desire to cut off questioning with sufficient clarity that a reasonable
police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be an asser-
tion of the right to remain silent." Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th
852 [Vol. 44: p. 843
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Once questioning has ceased, the police must "scrupulously honor" the
invocation of the right, as required by Michigan v. Mosley.54 In Mosley, po-
lice arrested the suspect for armed robbery and, during the resulting inter-
rogation at the station house, Mosley stated he did not want to answer any
questions about the robberies.5 5 Several hours later another detective
questioned Mosley about a homicide unrelated to that robbery.5 6 Mosley
did not immediately object to this second interrogation, and during it in-
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1086 (1995). In other words, "It] he determination
of whether a suspect's right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored re-
quires a case-by-case analysis." Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 840 (11th Cir.
1987).
The objective analysis of unambiguity may not consider behavior following the
request. See Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 100 (1984) ("[A]n accused's postrequest
responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on
the clarity of the initial request itself.") (emphasis omitted). Behavior before the
request is, however, fair game. See id. at 99-100 ("[A]n accused's request. . . may
be characterized as ambiguous or equivocal as a result of events preceding the
request or of nuances inherent in the request itself.").
54. 423 U.S. 96, 102-03 (1975). Compare United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772,
775-76 (8th Cir. 1997) (stopping interrogation immediately, waiting three hours,
and providing fresh warnings indicative of scrupulous honor); West v. Johnson, 92
F.3d 1385, 1403 (5th Cir. 1996) (allowing passage of thirteen hours and fresh
warnings scrupulously honored request), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1242 (1997); United
States v. Moreno-Flores, 33 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding scrupulous
honor when officer asked off-hand question unrelated to investigation and, not
regarding reminder of rights, suspect begins speaking about investigation); United
States v. Evans, 917 F.2d 800, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding officer mentioning
to suspect what would happen at processing and before the magistrate was still
honoring suspect's rights), andJackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1471-72 (11th
Cir. 1988) (finding scrupulous honor in immediate termination, repeated issuance
of fresh warnings during wait of six hours), with United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d
150, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding invocation of right followed by fresh warnings
not scrupulous honor); United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1384-86 (1st Cir.
1992) (finding no scrupulous honor where police repeatedly spoke to suspect to
induce change of mind and emphasized danger present to suspect if he failed to
cooperate); Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 939-41 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding short
wait and no fresh warnings not scrupulous); Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 725-26
(5th Cir. 1990) (finding no scrupulous honor in wait of several minutes followed
by incriminating questions); Kordenbrock, 919 F.2d at 1097, 1100 (finding error in
continuation of questioning after invocation of right); Pena, 897 F.2d at 1081-82
(finding violation where officer failed to clarify ambiguous request and informed
suspect of recovered evidence), and Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021-22
(2d Cir. 1989) (telling suspect "now is the time" to make a statement despite clear
invocation of right is coercive).
55. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 97-98. The arrest paperwork and interrogation
lasted approximately 20 minutes, and at no time did Mosley request to speak with
counsel. See id. at 97.
56. See id. at 97-98 (noting circumstances surrounding interrogation). Mosley
was initially arrested sometime in the early afternoon, and the second interroga-
tion occurred at approximately six p.m. See id. The homicide occurred during a
robbery that was not the subject of the initial interrogation. See id.
11
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criminated himself.57 Mosley was subsequently convicted of murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment.
58
The Mosley Court first noted that Miranda required that when a sus-
pect invokes his or her right to silence, interrogation must cease.59 When
could interrogation begin again?60 The Court specifically rejected three
conceptions of when interrogation could resume: (1) never, under any
circumstances; (2) at any time, but all further statements are inadmissible
as coerced; or (3) following a momentary respite. 6 1 The intention of the
Miranda Court was "to adopt 'fully effective means.., to notify the person
of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be
scrupulously honored . . "',62 The ability of the suspect to limit times,
subjects and indeed the presence of interrogation, the Court held, cures
the environment of its coercive taint.63 If the suspect has control of the
interrogation, then the issue must be dependent upon whether that con-
trol (i.e., the invocation of the right to terminate questioning) was "scru-
pulously honored" as required by Miranda.64
57. See id. (noting lack of objection). Mosley did, of course, object to the use
of the statement at trial. See id. at 98-99.
58. See id. at 99 (noting conviction).
59. See id. at 100-01 (stating that invocation of right to silence mandates termi-
nation of interrogation (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966)).
The Court noted that this case did not cover invocations of the right to counsel, as
Mosley never requested the aid of counsel. See id. at 101 n.7 (noting issue does not
contain invocation of counsel).
60. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 n.44 (noting that in presence of counsel invo-
cation of right to silence may be followed by further questioning absent evidence
of overbearing). Note that this did not pertain to Mosley, who neither requested
nor was furnished counsel. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101 n.7 (noting no request).
61. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 101-02 (suggesting possible interpretations of Mi-
randa). Obviously none of these possibilities provides a workable solution. The
first, for example, could result in a suspect, who invoked his right to silence 50
years prior, being immune from interrogation. The second would disallow sponta-
neous admissions of guilt. The third would allow police to continue with interro-
gation after the pause of a mere heartbeat. Note that no definition is offered for
coerced. One commentator has opined that no sufficient definition for coercion
can be derived. See Albert W. Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 DENV. U. L.
REv. 957, 957 (1997) (commenting that no legal definition exists for coercion).
Professor Alschuler also contends that courts are likely to consider confessions ob-
tained through offensive police practices as coerced regardless of the validity of
the statement. See id. (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE § 6.2(b) at 295 (1985) (noting practice of excluding confessions obtained
through offensive means)).
62. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479).
63. See id. at 103-04 (observing that "[t]hrough the exercise of his option to
terminate questioning he can control the time at which questioning occurs, the
subjects discussed, and the duration of the interrogation . . .[t]he requirement
that law enforcement authorities must respect a person's exercise of that option
counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting").
64. See id. at 104 (noting test for statements made during re-interrogation fol-
lowing invocation of right to silence is whether police "scrupulously honored"
right to silence (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479)). Note that Mosley requires
police to scrupulously honor the request under Miranda, not under the Fifth
854 [Vol. 44: p. 843
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The Court did not, however, explain exactly what it meant by "scrupu-
lously honored," instead it applied the test to the case at bar.65 The appli-
cation was fact based, and the Court noted that "the police here
immediately ceased the interrogation, resumed questioning only after the
passage of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of
warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not
been a subject of the earlier interrogation." 66 Courts have since used
these factors when determining what constitutes scrupulous honor.
67
Amendment. See id. at 104 ("We therefore conclude that the admissibility of state-
ments obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends
under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously
honored.'").
65. See id. at 104-05 (applying scrupulous honor test to facts).
66. Id. at 106. The Court contrasted these facts with those of Westover v. United
States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a companion case to Miranda. In Westover, the subject
was arrested at approximately nine p.m. and questioned, without warnings, until
noon the next day. See Mosley 423 U.S. at 106; Westover, 384 U.S. at 456-57. At noon,
the FBI took over the interrogation, gave Westover his warnings and questioned
him for two more hours until he incriminated himself. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106;
Westover, 384 U.S. at 456-57. The Court in Mosley noted that the federal agents
were recipients of the benefit of the earlier long interrogation by the local authori-
ties, and the belated warnings had not purged that later interrogation of its inher-
ently coercive nature. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 106 (noting that Westover
interrogation was coercive).
67. Compare United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1997) (stop-
ping interrogation immediately, waiting three hours, and providing fresh warnings
indicative of scrupulous honor); West v. Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1403 (5th Cir.
1996) (allowing passage of thirteen hours and fresh warnings scrupulously
honored request), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1242 (1997); United States v. Moreno-Flo-
res, 33 F.3d 1164, 1170 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding scrupulous honor when officer
asked off-hand question unrelated to investigation and, not regarding reminder of
rights, suspect begins speaking about investigation); United States v. Evans, 917
F.2d 800, 804-05 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding officer mentioning to suspect what
would happen at processing and before the magistrate was still honoring suspect's
rights), andJackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1471-72 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding
scrupulous honor in immediate termination, repeated issuance of fresh warnings
during wait of six hours), with United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 154-55 (3d Cir.
1998) (finding an invocation of right followed by fresh warnings not scrupulous
honor); United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1384-86 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding
no scrupulous honor where police repeatedly spoke to suspect to induce change of
mind and emphasized danger present to suspect if he failed to cooperate); Nelson
v. Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 939-41 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding short wait and no fresh
warnings not scrupulous); Charles v. Smith, 894 F.2d 718, 725-26 (5th Cir. 1990)
(finding no scrupulous honor in wait of several minutes followed by incriminating
questions); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1097, 1100 (6th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (finding error in continuation of questioning after invocation of right);
United States v. Pena, 897 F.2d 1075, 1081-82 (11th Cir. 1990) (establishing viola-
tion where officer failed to clarify ambiguous request and informed suspect of re-
covered evidence), and Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021-22 (2d Cir. 1989)
(telling suspect "now is the time" to make a statement for purposes of inducing
waiver not scrupulous honor).
13
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B. The Circuit Split Over the Meaning of Mosley
Different courts, however, have used different tests for determining
what constitutes "scrupulous honor." The United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit favors a test modeling the analysis used in Miranda.68
The First Circuit also noted that at no time did the Mosley court suggest
that the stringency of an admissibility test was dependent upon the
amount of time that had passed since the invocation of the right by the
defendant.69  The court noted that Mosley creates prophylactic
requirements:
Based on the assumption that repeated rounds of questioning in
the face of a decision to remain silent nearly always will under-
mine a suspect's will[, and therefore] a Fifth Amendment viola-
tion is presumed unless the law enforcement officials have
followed specified procedures. In this setting, the prophylactic
requirement is that the police "scrupulously honor" the "right to
cut off questioning."70
Scrupulous honor, stated the court, involves a multiple factor review con-
sidering the time between interrogations, whether or not fresh warnings
were provided, the scope of the subsequent interrogation and how force-
ful the police were in questioning the suspect after the invocation of the
right to silence. 71
There is some ambiguity in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit's handling of this issue.7 2 Although the most recent case
appeared to mandate fresh issuance of warnings, it then also considered
other factors that reflect whether the right was scrupulously honored, and
68. See Barone, 968 F.2d at 1383 (noting that Fifth Amendment violation is
presumed unless law enforcement officers scrupulously honor invocation of right
to silence). Also, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is the
focus of this Casebrief, its decisions are discussed at length in the Analysis section,
supra notes 98-152.
69. See id. (noting no difference in test stringency for various time periods
since invocation of right). The court also rejected the view that the applicable
standard was whether the revocation of the right was voluntary. See id.
70. Id. (quoting Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102) (emphasis omitted).
71. See id. (relating factors considered in analysis of interrogations subsequent
to invocation of right to silence).
72. Compare Campaneria, 891 F.2d at 1021 ("Questioning can be resumed after
fresh Miranda warnings are given and the right to remain silent is otherwise scru-
pulously honored, for example, by renewing the questioning only after the passage
of a significant period of time and by limiting the renewed questioning to a differ-
ent subject matter than the original interrogation."), with Wilson v. Henderson,
584 F.2d 1185, 1188 (2d Cir. 1978) ("We are not of the belief, however, that the
crucial factor in determining a Fifth Amendment violation should be the length of
time between questioning."), and United States v. Collins, 462 F.2d 792, 797 (2d
Cir. 1972) ("So long as such [police requested] reconsideration is urged in a care-
ful, noncoercive manner at not too great length and in the context that a defend-
ant's assertion of his right not to speak will be honored, it does not violate the
Miranda mandate.").
856 [Vol. 44: p. 843
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it did not explicitly overrule earlier precedent requiring merely that fresh
warnings be given. 73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has only
heard one case dealing directly with this issue. 74 "As such, its method of
analysis cannot be examined beyond the limited facts that were at bar. It
appears that the Fourth Circuit is following early Second Circuit prece-
dent, holding that a police officer who immediately followed an assertion
of the right to silence with a request to reconsider still scrupulously
honored the suspect's invocation.75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit appears to
base its decisions primarily upon the time elapsed between the assertion of
the right and the second interrogation. 76 It does acknowledge, however,
that the analysis must be done on a case-by-case basis.7 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has never
explicitly stated the analysis it uses to determine whether the invocation of
the right to silence has been scrupulously honored. 78 It is, however, clear
that when police do not stop the interrogation and urge the suspect to
continue speaking they do not scrupulously honor.79 But when police
leave the room for only a few minutes, return with a co-suspect, tell the
suspect the co-suspect has implicated him or her in the crime and respond
to the co-suspect's question "what should I do?" with a statement to tell the
truth, the police have scrupulously honored the suspect's invocation.80
73. See Campaneria, 891 F.2d at 1021 (noting threshold requirement of fresh
warnings, and further factors to be considered, with goal of preventing police over-
bearing suspect's will); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting
that invocation of right to silence immediately followed by more questioning is not
scrupulous honor); Wilson, 584 F.2d at 1188 (observing that time is not crucial
element); Collins, 462 F.2d at 797 (allowing police to ask reconsideration of invoca-
tion of right under certain circumstances).
74. See generally United States v. Smith, 608 F.2d 1011 (4th Cir. 1979).
75. See id. at 1014 (holding assertion of right immediately followed by police
comment that "it would be best to cooperate" still scrupulous honor) (citing Col-
lins, 462 F.2d at 795).
76. See West v.Johnson, 92 F.3d 1385, 1403 (1996) (noting that passage of 13
hours between interrogations meets scrupulous honor requirement) (citing Kelly
v. Lynaugh, 862 F.2d 1126, 1130 (5th Cir. 1988)).
77. See United States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697, 699 (5th Cir. 1995)
("With no bright line test, courts must evaluate the facts of each case to determine
if the resumption of police interrogation was consistent with scrupulous obser-
vance of the right to cut off questioning.") (citing Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872,
877 (5th Cir. 1992))).
78. See generally Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 889 F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1989), vacated
and reh'g granted, 896 F.2d 1457 (6th Cir. 1990), and reheard, 991 F.2d 1091 (6th Cir.
1990) (en banc); Jovanovic v. Engle, No. 84-4012, 1986 WL 16829 (6th Cir. Apr.
25, 1986).
79. See Kordenbrock, 889 F.2d at 78 (holding that police urging suspect to con-
tinue speaking and not pausing interrogation did not scrupulously honor invoca-
tion of right).
80. SeeJovanovic v. Engle, No. 84-4012, 1986 WL 16829, at *1 (finding that
police behavior scrupulously honored request).
1999]
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit adopted
an approach focusing on whether the police sought to undermine the re-
solve of the suspect.81 The court also, however, analyzes the factors enu-
merated in Mosley.82 The Seventh Circuit appears to have intended to
force its district courts' attention to whether a statement was "'was ob-
tained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitu-
tion.'"83 In so doing, the court found police had scrupulously honored a
suspect's invocation of the right, even when the subsequent interroga-
tions, unlike Mosley's, dealt with the same crime as the first.8 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has deter-
mined that the appropriate question is whether law enforcement officers
"persisted in 'repeated efforts to wear down the person's resistance' in or-
der to change the person's version of the facts."8 5 In its determinations,
the court has enumerated three factors, named by the Mosley Court, that
must be met before subsequent statements become admissible: "(1) there
was an immediate cessation of questioning upon defendant's request; (2)
a 'significant amount of time' had passed since the last session and a new
set of [Miranda] warnings was given; and (3) the second interrogation in-
volved inquiries concerning a separate crime."8 6 The court has inter-
preted the third factor to allow both discussions of identical crimes in
different locales or interrogations by officers of different precincts. 8 7
81. See United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 659 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting
that standard should reflect intentions of police in conducting second
interrogation).
82. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 106 (1975) (listing factors to consider
when analyzing whether police scrupulously honored suspect's invocation of right
to silence).
83. Schwensow, 151 F.3d at 659 (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112
(1985)).
84. See id. (noting that police questioning of suspect about same crime on
multiple occasions acceptable) (citing United States v. Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 106-07
(1st Cir. 1998); Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1993); United States
v. Hsu, 852 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1988);Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1471-72(11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 608 F.2d 1011, 1014-15 (4th Cir. 1979);
Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185, 1188-89 (2d Cir. 1978))).
85. United States v. McClinton, 982 F.2d 278, 282 (8th Cir. 1992) (quoting
Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105-06).
86. United States v. House, 939 F.2d 659, 662 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing Mosley,
423 U.S. at 104-105); see United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 1997)(noting that police must "allow a 'significant amount of time' to pass before ques-
tioning begins again, re-advise the detainee of her Miranda rights, and limit the
ensuing interrogation to questions regarding a separate crime not the subject of
the first questioning session") (citing House, 939 F.2d at 662)). Although the
Eighth Circuit has not quantified a "significant period of time", it considers peri-
ods as short as two hours acceptable. See Harley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1074
(8th Cir. 1993).
87. See United States v. Pugh, 25 F.3d 669, 673 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting discus-
sion of drug trafficking in two different states qualifies as interrogation regarding
separate crime); McClinton, 982 F.2d at 282 (holding that third factor is present
where two interviews are conducted by officers from different jurisdictions); cf
Hatley, 990 F.2d at 1074 (stating that "a second interrogation is not rendered un-
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted
a flexible standard in which the time between interrogations is not disposi-
tive.8 8 Curiously, the subject matter of the interrogation is not dispositive
either.8 9 Rather, the court devotes the bulk of its attention to a determi-
nation of the validity of the waiver prior to the second interrogation and,
derivatively, the provision of a second set of warnings.9 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit appears to
consider both the time between interrogations and the presence of a valid
waiver of fresh warnings as illumed by the holding and reasoning in Little-
john v. Nelson.9 1 In Littlejohn, the court found that an invocation of the
right to silence followed by termination of the interrogation until the next
morning, a fresh set of warnings and a signed waiver constituted scrupu-
lous honor.9 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has taken
the position that, while the analysis is to be conducted on a case-by-case
basis, the minimum requirement is either a significant passage of time be-
tween interrogations or a suspect-initiated conversation coupled with a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of the asserted right to silence.9 3
The passage of time can be between one and two hours and still constitute
scrupulous honor.9 4 There is also some evidence that the court considers
constitutional simply because it involves the same subject matter discussed during
the first interview").
88. See Hsu, 852 F.2d at 410 (noting that length of time between interroga-
tions is relevant but not "talismanic" proof of scrupulous honor) (citing United
States v. Davis, 527 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1975))).
89. See id. (stating "we have noted on several occasions that an identity of
subject matter in the first and second interrogations is not sufficient, in and of
itself, to render the second interrogation unconstitutional") (citing Grooms v. Kee-
ney, 826 F.2d 883, 886 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. Heldt, 745 F.2d 1275, 1278 n.5
(9th Cir. 1984))).
90. See id. at 410 (noting that issuance of second set of warnings is most im-
portant factor); see also United States v. Soliz, 129 F.3d 499, 504 (9th Cir. 1997)(finding that failure to discontinue interrogation is not scrupulous honor); United
States v. Pichay, No. 91-10571, 1993 WL 51199, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 1993) (not-
ing that questioning day after invocation, following fresh warnings, by officers of
different agency, scrupulously honored suspect's invocation).
91. See Littlejohn v. Nelson, No. 92-3062, 1992 WL 372593, at *2 (10th Cir.
Dec. 18, 1992) (noting scrupulous honor where police immediately terminate in-
terrogation and did not re-interrogate until following morning, after fresh warn-
ings and valid waiver).
92. See id. (same).
93. SeeJacobs v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1282, 1293 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting
threshold requirement for case-by-case analysis to begin) (citing Delap v. Dugger,
890 F.2d 285, 290 (11th Cir. 1989);Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1472 (11th
Cir. 1988)); see also Christopher v. Florida, 824 F.2d 836, 840 (11th Cir. 1987)
("The determination of whether a suspect's right to cut off questioning was scru-
pulously honored requires a case-by-case analysis.").
94. SeeJacobs, 952 F.2d at 1293 ("Law enforcement officials have been found
to have scrupulously honored a suspect's right to terminate questioning in cases in
which as little as one to two hours separated a suspect's invocation of her rights
1999]
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the number of sessions of questioning in its totality of the circumstances
equation.95
It does not appear the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has ever heard the issue. The closest issue reported
holds that after a suspect invokes his or her right to silence, and engages
the former interrogator in a casual conversation, a volunteered confession
is admissible.9 6 Because the conversation was suspect-initiated, of course,
an analysis of whether police scrupulously honored the request is
inappropriate. 97
III. ANALYSIS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has recently
spoken on the ramifications of the Miranda decision. 98 An understanding
of the Third Circuit's position on what constitutes interrogation and what
constitutes scrupulous honor are necessary for an understanding of the
analysis used to determine the fate of derivative evidence.
A. The Third Circuit's View of Scrupulous Honor
In Nelson v Fulcomer,99 the Third Circuit had cause to visit both the
definition of custodial interrogation and the impact created by police im-
propriety regarding statements obtained through interrogation's use.
100
In Nelson, Terrence Moore confessed to participation in the rape and mur-
and one subsequent interrogation.") (citing United States v. Nash, 910 F.2d 749, 752
(11th Cir. 1990))) (emphasis omitted).
95. See id. at 1294 (discussing interplay between rounds of questioning and
length of time between rounds).
96. See United States v. Hackley, 636 F.2d 493, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting
that, after invocation of right, casual conversation that leads to confession
admissible).
97. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (finding that to protect
privilege against self-incrimination, police are required to honor scrupulously). It
is clear that when a suspect initiates a conversation and the police have in no way
attempted to overbear that suspect's will, they have scrupulously honored the re-
quest. Cf Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (noting application
of Miranda to interrogation).
98. See United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 156 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing
evidentiary procedures following violation of the Miranda decision); Nelson v.
Fulcomer, 911 F.2d 928, 932 (3d Cir. 1990) (discussing requirements for scrupu-
lous honor).
99. 911 F.2d 928 (1990).
100. See id. at 931 (noting several issues on appeal, including whether con-
frontation by another suspect constituted custodial interrogation and whether po-
lice scrupulously honored invocation of right to silence). The court also visited
two other issues: whether the defendant in fact invoked his right to silence and
whether the confrontation with the other suspect violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment fight to counsel. See id. Both issues are outside the scope of this
Casebrief.
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der of a young woman. 10 1 In his confession, Moore testified that defend-
ant, Bruce Nelson, had actually initiated both crimes.1" 2 Police then read
Nelson his rights, and he invoked his right to silence. 10 3 After Moore con-
fessed and the police asked him to tell Nelson what he had done, a con-
frontation ensued in which Nelson asked how much Moore had told the
police.10
4
The court first defined what constituted a custodial interrogation. 10 5
The Innis decision made it clear that "any words or actions on the part of
the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody)
that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect" constitute an interrogation.1 0 6
The court found it important not only that police had contrived to
confront Nelson with his alleged partner and instructed Moore to tell Nel-
son he had confessed, but also what may have been told to Nelson, by
either police or Moore, before the incriminating statement was made. 10 7
101. See id. at 929. Apparently the defendant, Nelson, and Moore stole a van
in order to enter a parking lot to commit another theft. See id. at 930. The victim
walked into the garage and was forced into the van, where she was raped and
murdered. See id.
102. See id. at 930. Moore testified that it was Nelson who initially accosted
the victim, Nelson who forced her into the van, Nelson who initially raped her,
Nelson who encouraged Moore to rape her as well and Nelson who killed her. See
id. Interestingly enough, all fingerprints, hair and saliva samples from the crime
scene matched Moore's characteristics and were inconsistent with Nelson's. See id.
103. See id. Although the Commonwealth initially contested that Nelson had
invoked his right, the court found that "the Commonwealth essentially argues that
we should reject an uncontradicted factual finding of the state court which the
Commonwealth's own attorney unambiguously corroborated during the state trial
proceedings." Id. at 932. In the record there was only one reference to Nelson's
invocation, and it was by the Commonwealth's counsel. See id. at 931.
104. See id. at 930. It is unknown what, if anything, Nelson was told before he
posed the incriminating question. See id. at 934.
105. See id. at 932 (noting that "[c]ustodial interrogation encompasses not
only direct questioning by the police, but also its functional equivalent") (citing
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980) (internal quotes omitted))). The
court cited Innis and its rule that the "functional equivalent" of custodial interroga-
tion could also be the subject of Fifth Amendment and Miranda violations, specifi-
cally noting that the police practices Miranda sought to abolish were not limited to
direct questioning. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 932-33 (citing Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01).
The court also discussed Arizona v. Mauro and its holding that allowing a suspect to
speak with his wife and then using the conversation against the suspect was not the
"kind of psychological ploy that properly could be treated as the functional
equivalent of interrogation ... ." 481 U.S. 520, 527 (1987). It should be noted
that in Mauro, the wife insisted on speaking with the husband, and there was no
indication the police used the conversation as a ploy to get Mauro in incriminate
himself. See id. at 527-29 (holding Mauro was not interrogated).
106. Nelson, 911 F.2d at 933-34 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301) (internal quo-
tation marks ommitted). The inquiry conducted by the Third Circuit here appears
to involve the totality of the circumstances.
107. See id. at 934 (discussing factors to consider in determination of presence
of Innis violation). The critical fact the court appeared to be missing was whether
Nelson had been told Moore had confessed, or whether he simply assumed it. See
1999]
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The court held that if Nelson had merely been confronted with Moore,
that would not be "reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating re-
sponse."' 0 8 The court acknowledged that caselaw was unsettled on this
point, with several courts, including two courts of appeals, holding that
confrontation with an alleged partner was inherently coercive and in-
fringed upon Fifth Amendment rights. 10 9 The court also stressed that the
communication between Nelson and Moore took place in an environment
palpably dominated by the police, in which it was to be expected that every
word said would be communicated to the police.110
id. The court found that "[c]onfronting a suspect with his alleged partner and
informing him that his alleged partner has confessed is very likely to spark an
incriminating response from a suspect if that suspect is in fact guilty." Id. The
court noted that although Moore's instructions had also been to tell Nelson that
Moore's confession had implicated him, its ruling would have been the same if the
police had merely confronted Nelson with Moore and the knowledge of a confes-
sion without any implication of Nelson. See id.
108. Id. at 938. The court did point out that a confrontation between a sus-
pect and his questioned partner, even without a confession, has coercive impact.
See id. The court also confined its analysis to the assumption that "Nelson made his
remark before being informed of the confession, and that Moore said and did
nothing, other than enter Nelson's interrogation room, to provoke a response
from Nelson." Id. The court's two plausible scenarios thus leave out the possibility
that Moore entered the room, made inflammatory comments other than admis-
sion of a confession, and that after these comments Nelson made his inculpatory
remark.
109. See id. at 935 (noting creation of circuit split). The court did, however,
point out that the great majority of these cases were decided before Innis and that
it doubted the continued vitality of the opinions. See id. at 936. In fact, the court
noted that:
We have found no post-Innis case in which a court has sanctioned con-
fronting a suspect who has claimed his right to remain silent with his
alleged partner and advising him at the same time of the existence of a
confession by the partner. We think law enforcement agents should real-
ize that this combination is particularly well calculated to produce incrim-
inating remarks.
Id. at 936.
110. See id. at 938 (noting that police dominated environment and expected
perception of communication to police). The court sought to distinguish the pres-
ent facts from those in Illinois v. Perkins, in which an undercover agent posed as a
prison inmate and was placed in the prisoners cell to elicit information. See id. at
937 (citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1990)). Noting that Miranda
protected prisoners in a police-dominated atmosphere, the Perkins Court held that
a cellblock interrogation was not the same coercive environment. See Perkins, 496
U.S. at 296. The court also held that Perkins was a case of "misplaced trust in one
... suppose [d] to be a fellow prisoner." Id. at 297. Miranda named two factors as
contributory to a coercive environment: fear of reprisal for silence and false hope
of clemency for confession. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 938. As neither factor applies to
a discussion between two supposed prisoners, the Perkins fact pattern avoids both
factors and does not fall under Miranda's protective web. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at
938 (noting Miranda inapplicable to Perkins). The Nelson court held that a police
interrogation, followed by an invocation of the right to silence, followed immedi-
ately by a police announcement that an alleged partner had confessed and a con-
frontation with that partner, was not comparable to the facts in Perkins. See id.
(noting police cannot avoid Miranda in this situation).
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The court next examined the confrontation as a failure of the police
to honor scrupulously Nelson's right to remain silent.1 11 The court noted
that the police did not wait a significant period of time, give Nelson fresh
Miranda warnings, question regarding a different crime or use different
police officers when they confronted Nelson with Moore. 1 2 Thus, the
court held that if the confrontation with Moore was interrogation, police
had failed to honor scrupulously Nelson's right to terminate the
interrogation. 113
B. The Fate of Derivative Evidence Following a Miranda Violation in the
Third Circuit
Most recently in United States v. Tyler, 1 4 the Third Circuit clarified the
analysis to be used in those cases where police officers fail to honor scru-
pulously a suspect's invocation of his or her right to silence. 115 In Tyler,
Willie Tyler was tried for his role in the murder of a state witness in the
drug trafficking trial of his brother, David Tyler. 116 Two months later,
police arrested Willie Tyler for his role in the murder and issued his Mi-
randa warnings, and Tyler stated he did not wish to make a statement.' 1 7
Law enforcement officers then took Tyler to the station where further dis-
cussion culminated in law enforcement officers re-issuing Miranda warn-
ings, and Tyler providing an incriminating statement.1 18 Eleven days
111. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 939 (examining claim of failure to honor scrupu-
lously invocation of right to remain silent); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 478-79 (1966) (noting requirement that police honor scrupulously invocation
of right).
112. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 939-40 (noting no indicia of scrupulously honor-
ing suspect's invocation of right to silence). Recall that the lead case on scrupu-
lously honoring an invocation of the right to remain silent is Michigan v. Mosley,
423 U.S. 96 (1975), and that in Mosley, after the suspect had invoked his right to
counsel, police waited several hours, had a different officer enter, gave a fresh set
of Miranda warnings and discussed crimes other than those provoking the invoca-
tion of the right. See id. at 104. For a more detailed discussion of the facts and
holding of Mosley, see supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
113. See Nelson, 911 F.2d at 940-41 (noting that under circumstances interro-
gation would fail to honor scrupulously suspect's rights). Hence, the issue of
whether Nelson was informed of his alleged partner's confession again becomes
critical because, if he was, then the confrontation was interrogation, and thus im-
permissible under Mosley. See id. at 938-41 (noting possible outcome on remand).
114. 164 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 1998).
115. See id. at 151-59 (discussing various rights and standards implicated by
custodial interrogation).
116. See id. at 151-52. The day before David Tyler's trial was to begin, he and
his accomplices beat, stabbed and then shot a government witness. See id. The
witness had previously testified against Tyler and several other individuals in a pre-
liminary hearing. See id.
117. See id..
118. See id. (noting statement introduced at trial). Regarding the discussion
that led up to the incriminating statement, it is unclear what exactly was said, who
exactly was present and exactly when the conversation took place. See id. One
state trooper testified that he and three others were talking to Tyler around an
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later, while Tyler was in custody at the county jail following his arraign-
ment, he was again questioned by state troopers and again made incrimi-
nating statements. 119
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Penn-
sylvania suppressed any statements Tyler may have made from the time he
was brought to the interrogation room until the time he was re-issued his
Miranda warnings. 120 The district court did not, however, find error in
the state court's admittance of the inculpatory remark that followed the
re-issue of Miranda warnings, as well as the remark made eleven days later,
following Tyler's arraignment.
121
The Third Circuit took issue with the district court's handling of
these claims of Miranda violation. 122 The appellate court reiterated that
hour before the incriminating statement was made, discussing hunting and other
such things unrelated to the investigation. See id. Tyler then became emotional
and stated that he did not know that "they were going to kill [her] ... that he was
there when it happened but he did not see [who] did the shooting." Id. at 153. At
this point Tyler was re-issued his Miranda warnings and he revealed all he knew of
the murder. See id. at 153-54. Another trooper's testimony, however, states that he
and Tyler were the only people present, that Tyler began to cry, "and that the
trooper told Tyler to 'tell the truth' when he began crying." Id. at 154. The sec-
ond trooper also testified that after he was told to tell the truth Tyler began to
speak, was re-issued his Miranda warnings, and then made the incriminating state-
ments. See id. The court pointed out discrepancies between the testimony of the
two state troopers present during the investigation. See id. As it related to the
incriminating statement, the court found it did not matter which version of the
facts was true, because in no version did the troopers scrupulously honor Tyler's
invocation of his right to silence. See id. at 155 (noting in either version Tyler was
told to "tell the truth").
119. See id. at 156 (noting further interrogation). Although the state troopers
testified that Tyler initiated this conversation, the court was reluctant to accept this
given the discrepancies in the prior testimony of these troopers about Tyler's ear-
lier statements. See id. at 156 n.10, 158 (noting inquiry on remand must include
who initiated interrogation).
120. See id. at 152. This would appear to cover the remarks made by Tyler
that he did not know that the witness was to be killed, that Tyler was present and
that Tyler did not see who shot the witness. See id. at 152-53 (noting statements
made before re-issuance of Miranda warnings). The two inculpatory remarks used
in trial against Tyler, however, were issued after Tyler was read his Miranda rights
and again after a period of 11 days and were not the remarks which were later
suppressed. See id. at 152.
121. See id. at 152, 156 (noting lack of error). The court noted that the main
difference in the contents of these remarks appear to be that in the remark follow-
ing the re-issue of Miranda warnings, Tyler indicated that his brother wished to kill
the witness, where in the remark obtained days later, Tyler stated his brother
wished only to scare her. See id. at 158. Although there may be no pragmatic
difference between the two, the court left open the possibility that if the second
remark was admissible, the admission of the first may not be harmless error. See id.
at 158-59 (noting district court may have to decide this issue on remand).
122. See id. at 152 ("Although we agree that the district court erred in denying
the suppression motion as to the (earlier] statement, we cannot, on the basis of
this record, make a determination as to the [later] statement."). Although the
court did not render judgment upon the admissibility of the later statement, in-
stead remanding the issue to the district court for further consideration, it did
[Vol. 44: p. 843
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Miranda requires not only the issuance of basic warnings regarding consti-
tutional rights, but also that police honor the invocation of those rights.'
23
Given that Tyler was brought into a small room, containing a timeline of
the murder investigation as well as photographs of the corpus delecti, was
left in that room for hours, that at least one, possibly as many as four, state
troopers began talking to him and that only after he had began to speak
were his rights again delineated, the court was unable to hold that Tyler's
right to silence was scrupulously honored. 124 Although the court did not
explicitly state the test used to determine whether the police scrupulously
honored an invocation of the right, the citation to Mosely and the listing of
different dimensions of the interrogation strongly imply that a totality of
the circumstances test was used, in which the lengthy conversation prior to
re-issuance of the Miranda warnings and physical conditions of the interro-
gation room weighed prominently.
1 25
The Third Circuit next turned its attention to the later statement,
procured after Tyler had been arraigned but before counsel had been ap-
express displeasure at the methodology used by the district court in concluding
that the statement was indeed admissible. See id. at 157, 159 (noting district court
did not make adequate inquiry to support its finding). Specifically, the district
court held that "'[T]here is nothing in the record to support an argument that
Defendant's waiver was not knowingly made.'" Id. at 156 (quoting district court
opinion) (editorial alterations in original). The Third Circuit stated that it ap-
pears the district court had thus required Tyler to prove that his statement was not
made pursuant to a valid Miranda waiver. See id. The burden, of course, runs the
other way. See id.
123. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) ("[U]nless other fully
effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to
assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, [certain warn-
ings] are required.. . ."); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) ("We
... conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in cus-
tody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to
cut off questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.'").
124. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 153-55 (discussing nature of interrogation and not-
ing failure of police to honor scrupulously invocation of right against self incrimi-
nation). Notice that several of these factors have been present separately and that
courts have found that police scrupulously honored the right. For a general dis-
cussion of cases implicating the scrupulously honor test;see supra note 67 and
accompanying text. The district court held that because Tyler had again been
issued his Miranda warnings, any coercive taint from the circumstances had been
alleviated. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 154 (noting district court opinion). The Third
Circuit replied:
[1] t is clear that police can not, as if by alchemy, negate Tyler's invocation
of his right to remain silent by a mantra-like recitation of Miranda warn-
ings. The warnings are not intended to be a mere ritual, the exercise of
which guarantees the admissibility of any statement that is obtained in a
custodial interrogation regardless of the circumstances.... Here the [ac-
tions of the troopers] after Tyler had invoked his Miranda rights is the
antithesis of scrupulously honoring his right to remain silent.
Id. at 155.
125. See id. at 153-55 (citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975)).
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pointed.' 2 6 Acknowledging that Tyler presented a case of first impression,
the court set out to determine the appropriate analysis when police failure
to honor scrupulously a suspect's invocation of the right to silence leads to
further evidence.' 27 The Court stated that the analysis "used to resolve
allegations that statements were tainted by a prior violation of the Fourth
and/or Fifth Amendment should also guide, though not control, our in-
quiry .... -"128 Judge McKee then analyzed the later statement under the
theories that it was a waiver of the right to counsel and that it was inadmis-
sible as the fruit of a prior constitutional violation.1 29 The court noted
that the mere recitation of fresh Miranda warnings was necessary, but not
sufficient, to break the causal link between the prior violation of Tyler's
126. See id. at 156 (discussing admissibility of later statement). Although
counsel had yet to be appointed, the court correctly pointed out that Tyler's Sixth
Amendment right had been activated by the arraignment. See id. (noting right of
counsel had attached).
127. See id. (noting that "[t]his case raises an issue that we have not yet ad-
dressed in the context in which Tyler raises it"). One of Tyler's arguments was that
his later statement should be suppressed as the product of earlier violations of his
Fifth Amendment right. See id.
128. Id. The court also noted that Tyler had presented his claim under Mos-
ley. See id. at 155 n.8. The court also appears to be implicating the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine as guidance for its Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. See
id. at 155-56 n.8, 156 (noting assertion of constitutional violation and section titled
"Fruit of the Poisonous Tree"). The court also quoted United States v. Bayer
After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by confessing, no
matter what the inducement, he is never thereafter free of the psycholog-
ical and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get
the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a case, a later
confession may always be looked upon as a fruit of the first.
Id. at 156 (quoting United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540 (1947)).
Nevertheless, the court does not follow Bayer far enough. Bayer immediately
goes on to say that "[T]his Court has never gone so far as to hold that making a
confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the
confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed."
Bayer, 331 U.S. at 540.
Note also that Elstad specifically rejects application of the fruit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine to violations of Miranda. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308
(1985) (holding that fruit of poisonous tree doctrine is inapplicable to Miranda
violations). Elstad, however, dealt with a case of technical violation of Miranda
where there was no challenge to the assertion that the actual statement was un-
coerced and voluntary. See id. Thus, the Elstad decision does not specifically forbid
the use of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine when the violation is not of
Miranda, but of the Fifth Amendment proper.
129. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 155 n.8, 156 (discussing multiple paths of analysis
available to court). The court rapidly dealt with the waiver analysis because the
primary contention was uncertainty over the standard imposed by the district
court. See id. (noting district court's reversal of burden of proof). To the court, it
appeared from the record that the district court required Tyler prove that his
waiver was not knowing and voluntary. See id. The circuit court correctly pointed
out that the correct standard required the prosecution prove the waiver was know-
ing and voluntary. See id.
866
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Fifth Amendment rights and the later prison statement.1 30 The court
went on to list several factors, explicitly not an exclusive list, that deter-
mine where and if a causal break is created: (1) the passage of time be-
tween the two statements, (2) the subject matter of the second
interrogation and (3) whether the interrogators are coercive or overbear-
ing.'3 1 It is interesting to note that the court linked violations of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments and discussed this later statement in terms
of being the fruit of a prior constitutional violation and not as the fruit of
a prior Miranda violation. a
3 2
The court then held that the later statement could only be admitted if
the police had scrupulously honored Tyler's invocation of his right to si-
lence when he was first arrested, and the court tied police exploitation of
earlier illegal statements into this test of scrupulous honor.'3 3 Thus, in-
stead of using the "fruit of the poisonous tree" to suppress the statement
initially, the court required a similar "fruit" analysis be conducted as a por-
tion of the larger scrupulous honor analysis.
1 34
130. See id. at 157 (noting recitation of Miranda warnings does not by itself
purge statement of taint); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 602 (1975) ("If
Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitu-
tional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the ... violation, the effect
of the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted.").
131. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 158 (noting considerations in judicial determina-
tion of break in causal chain between earlier illegal statements and subsequent
statements). The court borrowed heavily from persuasive authority of the Second
Circuit, noting the Second Circuit reasoned that "It]he purpose of [the Miranda]
rule is to counter the inherently coercive effects of custodial interrogations." Id. at
157 (quoting Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014, 1021 (1989)). The court also re-
iterated Elstad's rejection of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine as applied to
Miranda violations. See id. at 158 (discussing Elstad). This reference is confusing,
however, because Elstad applied only to technical violations of Miranda, and not to
violations of the Fifth Amendment proper. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 ("There is a
vast difference between the direct consequences flowing from coercion of a confes-
sion ... and the uncertain consequences of disclosure.., freely given in response
to an unwarned but noncoercive question.. ").
132. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 155 ("We believe the analysis that has been used to
resolve allegations that statements were tainted by a prior violation of the Fourth
and/or Fifth Amendment should also guide, though not control, our inquiry into
the failure to scrupulously honor Tyler's right to remain silent .. ").
133. See id. at 158 ("(T]he district court must first determine if the conduct of
the police in obtaining the [later] statement was consistent with their duty to scru-
pulously honor Tyler's prior assertion of his right to remain silent."). The court
required the district court to consider who initiated the conversation that resulted
in the later incriminating statements, the length of time between the earlier and
later interrogations, the extent to which the same police officers conducted both
interrogations, the manner in which the later interrogation was conducted and
anything else the district court thought would help determine "whether police ex-
ploited their prior disregard of Tyler's right to remain silent" when they obtained
the later statement. Id. The court also noted that "the inquiry must include con-
sideration of the extent to which the [later] statement was the result of the prior
misconduct that resulted in the [earlier] statement." Id.
134. See id. (discussing factors considered in scrupulous honor analysis). No-
tice, however, that because Elstad did not directly apply to the case at bar, the court
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Although such analytical jockeying may remove the "poisonous tree"
analysis from Elstad, such measures are only necessary if a duty to honor
scrupulously is not contained within the Fifth Amendment proper.
135
The distinction between scrupulous honor as an incidence of Miranda's
prophylactic rules and scrupulous honor as a Fifth Amendment right be-
comes crucial: if the failure merely violates the prophylactic rules, then
Elstad clearly prohibits the use of the "poisonous tree" doctrine with any
statements stemming from the failure. 136 The position that a lack of
scrupulous honor is a violation of the Fifth Amendment, not of Miranda,
has some support within the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, and
more in public policy. The distinction between violating a suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights and violating the prophylactic rules set forth in Mi-
randa is the distinction that takes this holding outside of Elstad.
13 7
A view of scrupulous honor as a substantive right guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment has some modest support in precedent. 138 The Mi-
randa decision itself differentiates between the procedural safeguards to
be observed and the right that refusal to speak be scrupulously
honored.13 9 The Elstad Court stated that the Fifth Amendment prevented
prosecutors from using compelled testimony in their cases-in-chief. 140
Thus, it would appear that procurement of testimonial evidence through
was free to apply Won Sun directly to the later statement. For a discussion of possi-
ble implications of this approach, see infra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
135. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 300, 302 (1985) (discussing use of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda and remaining silent on statements
made following violation of Fifth Amendment).
136. See id. at 318 ("We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his
rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.").
137. See id. (discussing breadth of holding). The holding explicitly limits it-
self to uncoerced statements, whereas a failure to honor scrupulously the invoca-
tion is inherently coercive. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) ("The
requirement that law enforcement authorities must respect a person's exercise of
that option counteracts the coercive pressures of the custodial setting."); Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) ("Without the fight to cut off questioning, the
setting of in-custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free
choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked.").
138. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79 (noting requirement of honoring
right to silence).
139. See id. ("Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege
... notify the person of his fight of silence and to assure that the exercise of the
fight will be scrupulously honored .. "). The formation of the sentence strongly
suggests that the assurance of scrupulous honor is not itself one of the procedural
safeguards. The Court also noted that "[w]ithout the fight to cut off questioning,
the setting of in custody interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free
choice in producing a statement after the privilege has been once invoked." Id. at
474. It is obvious that the fight to cut off questioning is meaningless without assur-
ance that law enforcement officials will honor its invocation.
140. SeeElstad, 470 U.S. at 306-07 (noting scope of Fifth Amendment). Recall
that the only compulsion of which the Fifth Amendment is cognizant is that pro-
vided by the state. See, e.g., id. at 304-05 (noting Fifth Amendment's only con-
cerned with state coercion); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 & n.3
[Vol. 44: p. 843
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state coercion is the evil the privilege against self-incrimination seeks to
cure.1 4 1 A failure to honor scrupulously a suspect's attempt to avoid coer-
cive pressure must then itself be a violation of that prohibition against
coercion.
There is also some argument that the requirement that police officers
scrupulously honor an invocation of the right to silence is but another
procedural safeguard mandated by Miranda.1 42 The Mosley Court appears
to portray the right to terminate an interrogation as a safeguard against
violation of the right against self-incrimination. 14 3 Perhaps the most rele-
vant precedent against the consideration of scrupulous honor as a Fifth
Amendment right is contained in Mosley itself, which strongly implies that
the scrupulous honor requirement is merely a portion of the Miranda pro-
phylactic rules.144 If this is the case, then it is rather odd to propose a
constitutional right to honor scrupulously a procedural safeguard that is
not itself a constitutional right.
Public policy strongly supports the acknowledgement of the scrupu-
lous honor requirement as a right under the Fifth Amendment. 1 45 First,
as a protection of individual liberty, it is clear that the Fifth Amendment
would prohibit coercion of self-incriminating testimony. 1 46 That coercion
naturally extends to the suspect's ability to control the course of the inter-
rogation through its termination.147 Thus, it would appear to follow that
the suspect has a constitutional right that the government not actively in-
terfere with the invocation of the right to silence by its further interroga-
tion. Interestingly, at least one commentator has noted that the United
States Supreme Court's relegation of the Miranda rights to procedural
(1983) (per curiam) (same); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 & n.10
(1980) (same); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (same).
141. See Greenwood & Brown, supra note 48, at 1318-19 (noting that Fifth
Amendment protects against compulsion or coercion).
142. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975) ("The critical safe-
guard identified in the passage at issue is a person's 'right to cut off question-
ing.'") (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474)).
143. See id. (noting right of termination as procedural safeguard mandated by
Miranda).
144. See id. at 102-03. There, the Court succinctly stated: "We ... conclude
that the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has de-
cided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut off
questioning' was 'scrupulously honored.'" Id. at 104 (emphasis in original text).
145. Cf Greenwood & Brown, supra note 48, at 1320 ("The Fifth Amendment
is only violated when the inherently coercive environment created by custodial
interrogation actually functions to compel a confession.").
146. See id. (noting Fifth Amendment when coercive environment compels
confession).
147. See Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-04 (noting primary protection offered by Mi-
randa is suspect's ability to end questioning); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474 (noting
primary protection of suspect is ability to terminate interrogation).
1999] 869
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rules and not constitutional rights may have encouraged some law en-
forcement officers to violate Miranda intentionally. 148
The public also has an interest in truthful testimony in its courts of
law. 149 To some extent, following a failure to honor scrupulously an invo-
cation of the right to silence, some defendants will lie in order to appease
the police and end the interrogation.1 50
There are also public policy arguments against the view of scrupulous
honor as a constitutional requirement.1 5 1 Public safety and the interest in
seeing criminals held responsible for their actions are both served when
there are more convictions.1 52 To the extent then that any increase in
convictions obtained represent convictions of persons who actually com-
mitted the crimes in question, public safety and retribution for crime are
both served.
IV. CONCLUSION
It would appear then that the Third Circuit is not holding Mosley's
scrupulous honor requirement up as a constitutional right, but as a proce-
dural safeguard. 15 3 The Third Circuit also appears to consider in its
scrupulous honor jurisprudence a factor that "must include consideration
of the extent to which [a later] statement was the result of the prior mis-
conduct that resulted in [an earlier] statement."154 Such a position quite
possibly brings it squarely against Elstads prohibition against the applica-
tion of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine to violations of prophy-
lactic rules. 15 5 It is, however, possible to distinguish Elstad and Tyler on the
grounds that the former dealt with testimonial evidence obtained as a re-
sult of the procedural violation of Miranda, whereas the latter deals with
testimonial evidence obtained as a result of violation of Mosley.1 56
148. See Crawford, supra note 50, at 28-29 (noting view of Miranda rights as
procedural may have influenced some law enforcement officers to violate them
intentionally).
149. See Athanas, supra note 1, at 711 (noting unreliability of confessions
made to end coercion).
150. Cf id. at 712 (noting re-establishment of coercive atmosphere following
equivocal request for attorney). Theoretically, the same coercive atmosphere that
appears when a suspect's request for an attorney is ignored as "equivocal" exists
when police ignore an invocation of the right to silence.
151. See id. at 675 (noting public interest favors effective law enforcement).
152. Cf id. (noting need for effective law enforcement).
153. See United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing
scrupulous honor requirement as violation of Miranda and Mosley (citing Michigan
v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
154. Id. at 158.
155. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (noting "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine inapplicable to violations of Miranda prophylactic rule).
For a further discussion of the implications of the Elstad decision, see supra notes
41-51 and accompanying text.
156. See Tyler, 164 F.3d at 155 (noting Tyler's right to silence was not honored
scrupulously as required by Mosley).
[Vol. 44: p. 843
28
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss5/2
CASEBRIEF
Drawing that distinction certainly does not conclude the matter. El-
stad is quite clear that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" applies only to
constitutional violations, and a violation of Mosley is not necessarily a viola-
tion of the Constitution.157 One has to go further and assert that the Fifth
Amendment is concerned with prohibiting the government from coercing
citizens into providing testamentary evidence that will later be used against
them. 158 To that premise, add Mosley's admonition that failure to honor
scrupulously a request for termination of interrogation constitutes coer-
cion. 15 9 Then it is possible to combine the concept of the right to free-
dom from state coercion with the view that failure to honor the request to
terminate an interrogation is coercive. The result must be that a failure to
honor scrupulously the invocation is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
If that conclusion is accepted, then Elstad itself requires the "poisonous
tree" to bloom again in the Fifth Amendment.
Quinten Bowman
157. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 304 (noting exclusionary rule applies only to con-
stitutional errors).
158. See Athanas, supra note 1, at 675 (noting premise behind Miranda is that
privilege against self-incrimination is fundamental right and that state coercion is
violation of that right).
159. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 423, 103-06 (1975) (stating conditions
where invocation of privilege to stop questioning is not honored).
1999]
29
Bowman: Constitutional Law - When Coerced Statements Lead to More Evidenc
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44: p. 843
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss5/2
